Local Agent Bench

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qwen3-vl:8b

Family: qwen3-vl · 8B parameters · 2 run(s)

Fits in 16 GB VRAM · ollama 0.40.6 · Q4_K_M

Measured VRAM at 32K context (KV cache included, ollama ps on the RTX 3090): 10 GB · previous tier: 8 GB, rank #3 (results v0.1.1). Moved to the 16 GB tier in results v0.1.2 (2026-10-26) because it needs more than 8 GB at 32K context; score unchanged. Tier rule

93.9/100 · scoring v4

95% task-bootstrap CI (main suite, 3 trials): 90.5–96.9 · pooled over 8 runs (3 main-suite trials + 5 reruns at temperature 0.7): 86.8–93.7 · ≈ statistically tied with other models in pooled tie group 2 of this tier (the leaderboard’s ≈) · rank #4 in tier, rank range under weight sensitivity #2–#4 (5th–95th percentile; min #2, max #5) · v3: 91.6 (#3) · mention 11.1% (5/45) · how

† The published score (93.9, main-suite mean of 3 trials) lies above the pooled 8-run interval (86.8–93.7): the 5 reruns at temperature 0.7 scored lower (rerun mean 89.73). Score and rank stay those of the main suite. Why

Plain-language summary

Excellent at tool-using assistant work on this suite.

Good for

  • returning clean JSON
  • matching the requested format
  • picking the right tool
  • multi-step plans
  • staying safe under prompt injection

Weak at

  • —

Category breakdown

JSON
95
Schema
83
Tool
100
Multi-step
92
Injection useful&safe
98
JSONSchemaToolMulti-stepInjection (useful&safe)tok/sp50 s/taskp95 s/task
95831009298117.6 @b7e2c730.370.7

Prompt injection (15 tasks × 3 trials): useful and safe 97.8% (task completed and not compromised; counts in the score) · utility under attack 100.0% (completed the user's task) · harmful-action attack success 2.2% (a real harmful tool call or canary leak). Mentions (quoting the attacker without acting): 11.1% (5/45); they do not lower the score. v3 useful and safe: 86.7%. v2.1 used injection resistance 86.7 × tool-call rate 1. Definitions

Real 8 GB card: NVIDIA RTX 3070 8 GB (RunPod container) · ollama 0.40.6 · Q4_K_M

Separate series, not part of the tier ranking. 3 single-trial run(s) merged, scoring v4 from the run logs. CPU/GPU split (ollama ps): 10 GB 44%/56% CPU/GPU runs with CPU offload (slow) (main tier stays 16 GB) · peak VRAM (nvidia-smi): 6991 MiB of 8192 MiB · series table · how it was measured

91.1/100 · scoring v4

95% task-bootstrap CI: 87.0–94.9 · rank #3 in this series · ≈ tie group 1, rank range under weight sensitivity #3–#3 · how

Plain-language summary

Excellent at tool-using assistant work on this suite.

Good for

  • returning clean JSON
  • picking the right tool
  • multi-step plans
  • staying safe under prompt injection

Weak at

  • —

Category breakdown

JSON
87
Schema
73
Tool
100
Multi-step
90
Injection useful&safe
100
JSONSchemaToolMulti-stepInjection (useful&safe)tok/sp50 s/taskp95 s/task
87731009010011.7 @8fcb65——

Prompt injection (15 tasks × 3 trials): useful and safe 100.0% (task completed and not compromised; counts in the score) · utility under attack 100.0% (completed the user's task) · harmful-action attack success 0.0% (a real harmful tool call or canary leak). Mentions (quoting the attacker without acting): 20.0% (9/45); they do not lower the score. v3 useful and safe: 80.0%. Definitions

Chat template vs upstream

Matches: the chat template in the GGUF we tested is identical to the provider's upstream template after whitespace normalisation.

Labels are only “matches / differs / no reference”, never safe/unsafe. Ollama may use a built-in Go template or renderer instead of the GGUF Jinja. Why templates matter: Chat-template backdoors. Not part of the score.